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Stanek, P. (2014). Collective Decision-Making in Monetary Policy – A Survey (chapter 4) In: D. Kiendl-Wendner & K. Wach K. (Eds.), International Competitiveness in Visegrad Countries: Macrto and Micro Perspective. Graz: Fachhochschule Joanneym (ISBN: 978-3-200-03673-4).
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Abstract
The article aims at surveying the economic literature related to collective decision making in monetary policy. In order to do so it proposes a coherent framework allowing for a structured analysis of the factors influencing the works of a monetary policy committee. These factors are divided into external (shaped outside of the committee e.g. by law) and internal ones (related to the composition of the committee and interactions between its members). The survey proves that the problems analysed in literature indeed fit the proposed framework. Moreover, it points out some of the problems which are underexplored in the existing literature and thus provides interesting suggestions for further research, both theoretical and empirical, related to the functioning of monetary policy committees.
Keywords: collective decision making, monetary policy committee, committee size, decision rule, communication and learning
JEL classification: JEL: E58, D71, D83
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Contact:
Dr hab. Krzysztof Wach
Cracow University of Economics
wachk@uek.krakow.pl
www.wach.uek.krakow.pl
